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Wolfram Laube 
 
The promise and perils of water reforms: Perspectives 
from Northern Ghana 
 
 
Summary 
 
The Ghanaian government, while aiming at the privatisation of the coun-
try’s drinking water resources, initiated a wide reaching reform of the wa-
ter sector in 1996. The country’s water resources are now officially under 
the control of the Water Resources Commission (WRC), which propagates 
integrated water resource management (IWRM), and has the task of man-
aging the country’s water resources efficiently, sustainably and equitably.  
Taking an irrigation scheme in Northern Ghana as an example, this article 
shows formal and informal constraints on the implementation of the water 
reform at the local level. Given the local political climate of legal pluralism 
and weak governance, the question arises as to how the WRC, with slen-
der resources, is to implement resource management locally.  
As the WRC has also failed to influence important water sector decisions 
on the national level, there is the danger that powerful local and national 
interest groups use the reforms to legitimize their vested interest, thereby 
excluding others and ignoring environmental concerns. 
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he Ghanaian government enacted a new water law (Water Resources 
Commission Act, Act 522 of 1996) under considerable donor-pressure to 
privatise the urban water supply systems. This act laid the foundation for the 
creation of a new water bureaucracy and the promotion of integrated water 
resource management (IWRM) in Ghana (Government of Ghana 1996). Exist-
ing water rights were abolished, and a basis for the allocation and taxation of 
water use rights was created (Water Use Regulations, L.I 1692, 2001, 
Government of Ghana 2001). However, lack of political support and funds 
hampered the widespread implementation of the new legislation. The new 
water bureaucracy is only slowly taking control of water resource manage-
ment in Ghana. 
T 
Wolfram Laube 
 
420
This article analyses the difficulties and limitations the implementation 
of the water reforms, faces. At the national level, the WRC does not have the 
power to control the use of water resources if important economic and politi-
cal interests are at stake. It fails to influence crucial water sector decisions, for 
instance, in the mining areas, and regarding the construction of large dams, 
but is instead used by powerful actors to get water use permits to legitimise 
controversial claims on water resources despite serious ecological and social 
concerns. However, this article will focus on prospects for the local imple-
mentation of the new legislation. At the local level, the WRC, in view of its 
very limited resources, largely depends on the existing local government 
structures, such as the District Assemblies (DAs), for implementation. But lo-
cal governance is affected by multiple foci of power, e.g. district administra-
tion, politicians, (neo-)traditional authorities, local ‘big men’, as well as by 
legal pluralism. In addition it is often characterised by problematic relation-
ships between the local population and government officials. Results from 
anthropological research in the Tono irrigation project in the Upper East Re-
gion of Northern Ghana will serve as an example to show that official legisla-
tion hardly becomes hegemonic under these conditions. It is rather re-shaped 
and integrated into the complex framework of plural local institutions and 
interests, or simply ignored. Traditional rules, social networks, political pa-
tronage and outright corruption continue to influence the ways in which re-
sources are allocated and managed, often to the benefit of wealthier, better 
connected and more powerful actors. 
International legal prescriptions and the failure of the local  
implementation of water reforms in Africa 
In the past decades, various African countries including Ghana have been 
undergoing water reform processes. In rural areas, reform processes focus-
sed on the involvement of beneficiaries in the financing, operation and main-
tenance of water supply and irrigation infrastructure (Deverill et al. 2002, for 
drinking water supplies/Vermillion 1997, for irrigation). In urban areas, 
policies often instigated the privatisation of urban water supply systems 
(Bayliss and Hall 2000). These reforms were often supported (if not initiated) 
by donor agencies and were part of Structural Adjustment Programmes 
(SAPs) that cut state subsidies for the water sector. The experiences with the 
rural reform programmes have been mixed (Bruns and Meinzen-Dick 2000/ 
Vermillion 1997), irrigation reform programmes were contested (Mollinga 
and Bolding 2004), and the privatisation of urban water supplies was hotly 
debated (Balanyá et al. 2005/Estache et al. 2005). Apart from sector reforms, 
the governments in many African countries have enacted more far-reaching 
water laws. These water laws are designed to discontinue existing water 
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rights, to vest control of all the countries’ water resources in the state, and to 
establish new management frameworks for water resources. The reforms are 
based on the internationally promoted paradigm of Integrated Water Re-
sources Management (IWRM)1. The legal implementation of IWRM, like that 
of other ‘global legal prescriptions’ (Dezalay and Garth 2002: 1-2), is enforced 
through international organisations, loan conditionality, expert consulta-
tions, and economic as well as political pressure.  
However, the proponents of reforms aiming at IWRM seem to have an 
unrealistic and simplistic perception of the process of legal implementation 
(cf. Meyer, et al 1997; 1977; Benda-Beckmann 1989: 129/Benda-Beckmann et 
al. 1996 for the water sector). They overrate the transformative power of legal 
impositions as well as the political will of governments to enforce their im-
plementation. In addition, they tend to neglect the local context of implemen-
tation. Processes of legal implementation are embedded in highly specific 
cultural, socio-economic, institutional and political environments and have to 
be analysed from this perspective.  
For many parts of (West-) Africa it has been shown that the local state is 
characterised by incomplete decentralisation and democratisation. This 
makes local politics non-transparent and open to political patronage and the 
capture of strategic resources by elites (Guha-Khasnobis et al 2007; Chabal/ 
Daloz 2006; Bierschenk 1997/Mamdani 1996/Rösel and Trotha 1996/Spittler 
1981). The clientelistic nature of politics (Bayart 1993), as well as the alliances 
of politicians and administrators with ‘traditional’ authorities and local 
strongmen, has created powerful local interest groups whose interests cannot 
be easily disregarded even if legal requirements would demand it (Bier-
schenk and Sardan, 1999: 62-63/Migdal 1988: 247 ff). The implementation of 
legislation is also complicated by legal pluralism and struggles of local au-
thorities for power and resources (Moore 1978: 1 ff/von Benda-Beckmann 
1981). Therefore, to gain access to vital natural resources, actors do not neces-
sarily rely on legal frameworks but rather on social relations and networks 
(Berry 1993). In such settings, the local outcomes of reforms are difficult to 
predict. Experience from the implementation of resource reforms in Ghana 
(Amanor 1999 for forests/Kasanga 2001 for land) and elsewhere (Derman 
                                            
1  IWRM has, especially within the ‘development industry’, become a ‘sanctioned dis-
course’ (Allan 2003: 21-22). IWRM tries to balance liberal economic thinking and environ-
mental concerns with the equitable allocation and management of water resources within 
river basins (GWP 2000). But it has been objected that IWRM is an inherently western con-
cept that does not necessarily reflect the needs of the South (Allan 2003: 23-24), that water 
should not be regarded an economic good (Mehta 2000), that scientific knowledge and hu-
man management capacities are insufficient to allow for real IWRM (Kluge 2005: 37-38), 
and that it remains unclear how competing economic, environmental and socio-political ob-
jectives are going to be prioritised and negotiated (Laube 2005: 233). 
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and Hellum 2002/Sithole 2000 for water reforms; Lund 1998/Manji 2001 for 
land reforms) have shown that the ineffective implementation of well-meant 
reforms in the context of conflicting interests and weak local governance 
structures might easily compromise the underlying objectives of the new re-
source regimes. 
Preparing for private investment: The Ghanaian water reform process 
Since the 1980s, Ghanaian governments have pushed forward water sector 
reforms. Early reforms targeted the involvement of communities in irrigation 
management, but focussed mainly on the drinking water sector. Many urban 
water supply systems were in a poor state and a large percentage of both the 
urban and rural population were lacking access to improved water supplies 
(MoWH 2002). However, despite considerable investment by the World Bank 
and other donors, the demand for coverage and the efficiency of urban water 
supply systems remained low (MoWH 2002). Later on, the World Bank used 
the conditions of loans to put pressure on the Ghanaian government to in-
troduce cost recovery and privatisation approaches in the water supply sec-
tor (ISODEC 2002: 45-46). These reform efforts were not only followed by 
drastic changes in water supply policies2, but also led to overall water re-
forms. 
The need for a single supervisory body for the water sector had been 
discussed in Ghana as early as 1987 (MoWH 1999: 11). However, it was the 
plan to privatise urban water supplies that gave the impetus for the creation 
of the Water Resources Commission in 1996 (Government of Ghana 1996). In-
ternational consultants had made clear that the existing legal framework did 
not provide the security of investment that potential international investors 
expected (MoWH 1998: 48 / MoWH 1999: 9). While the water reforms can be 
criticised for having a rather instrumental function, Ghana certainly displays 
some demand for water resource management. While Ghana is well en-
dowed with water resources, seasonal shortages and annual variations are 
problematic. In addition, the country’s annual consumptive water demand is 
projected to almost multiply fivefold by 2020 (MoWH 1998: 33-34). Droughts 
and increasing demand lead to sectoral competition. This is especially so, be-
cause the Akosombo Dam, where 80% of Ghana’s electricity is generated, is 
situated downstream in the Volta River Basin. Droughts have already led to 
low water levels in the dam that caused severe power cuts in 1997/1998 and 
2006/2007. These power cuts have created political tensions and raised sus-
                                            
2  To create favourable conditions for the privatisation of urban water supplies, water 
prices were drastically increased, and the GWCL was released from the responsibility for 
the non-profitable rural and small town water supply sector (ISODEC 2002: 60). 
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picions about the increase of up-stream water demand and land use changes, 
for instance for irrigation (Adu-Asare 2007). 
National water legislation was introduced in 1906, when the 1903 River 
Ordinance of the British colonial government was enacted. The ordinance 
remained valid until 1996 but was superseded by several enactments which 
related to specific water uses (e.g. for domestic purposes, agricultural use, 
mining, etc.) (Laube and van de Giesen 2005 / WRC 1999: 4). However, cus-
tomary laws as well as riparian water rights3 granted under common law 
were officially recognised and continued to reign de facto over water use and 
management practices throughout the country. 
The new law has changed the way in which water rights are legally 
treated in Ghana. It vests the ownership of all the country’s water resources 
in the President and “abolishes the pre-1996 customary regime for ownership 
of water which resided in stools, communities, families and individuals” 
(Sarpong 2005: 6). Prior to the promulgation of the new legislation water re-
sources had not been subjected to state ownership (Opoku-Agyemang 2005: 
27-3). However, individual access to water resources for domestic uses and 
small-scale businesses and subsistence agriculture has been granted 
(Government of Ghana 2001: 4-5).  
The WRC commits/pledges itself to the paradigm of IWRM, at least 
rhetorically, and the aim/principle that water resource management should 
be sustainable, equitable, participative, gender sensitive and, last but not 
least, economically efficient. However, it remains unclear in how far the gov-
ernment really supports the WRC and its programme. The fact that the re-
sponsible Ministry for Works and Housing, despite substantial financial do-
nor support, did not provide any budget for the WRC in 1997 and 1998 (Nii 
Consult 1999: 42) and continues to allocate only limited funds to the WRC 
seems to indicate that political support for the water sector reform is limited. 
However, the WRC started its work in May 1998. In order to develop 
approaches for the local implementation of IWRM, the WRC has started 
three implementation pilot projects in the Densu (2002), White Volta (2004) 
and Ankobra (2007) river basins. Central to the effort to monitor and coordi-
nate the water sector is the local implementation of the water use regulations. 
Through a registration and permission process, all the country’s raw water 
abstractions, including those for domestic and agricultural purposes beneath 
a certain threshold, are to be registered. Uses that exceed basic water abstrac-
tion need permission and are to be billed. While abstraction tariffs are rather 
low, the fees for registration and permission are high (Government of Ghana 
                                            
3  ‘Under the common law rules on riparian rights, an owner of land abutting on water, 
known as the riparian owner, is entitled to the access to and regress from the water, 
whether it is a tidal or non-tidal river, lake etc. provided his land is in actual daily contact 
with the water, either laterally or vertically’ (Opoku-Agyemang 2005: 27-4). 
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2001). The registration process has begun and major water users have started 
to obtain water use permits. However, the large-scale implementation is still 
pending (Laube and van de Giesen 2005). 
The WRC faces the problem of having only limited influence on deci-
sions of high political importance. An example is the construction of the Bui 
dam, which is the major hydraulic infrastructure project currently under-
taken in Ghana. Since August 2007 (Okoampa-Ahoofe 2007: 1), a dam and 
400 MW power plant are being constructed at the Black Volta River despite 
serious ecological and social concerns (WRM 2006). The planning process 
had been ongoing for decades until the construction of the dam was finally 
decided in 2005 (Graphic Ghana 2005). However, it was only in 2007, after 
decisions over the location, type and the design of the dam had been taken, 
that the government approached the WRC to grant a permit for the construc-
tion of the dam.  
Similarly, the influence of the WRC on equity and ecology in the mining 
areas of the country seems to be rather minute. Mining companies have been 
given water use permits by the WRC and pay water use tariffs. However, 
open-pit-mining, as practised in many parts of Ghana, has a large impact on 
the hydrology and water quality of the areas concerned and negatively af-
fects the livelihood and health of local communities. The pollution of surface- 
and groundwater resources with cyanide and the drying-up of rivers and 
aquifers have created several conflicts between mining companies and the 
population affected. However, despite its responsibility to mitigate water re-
source conflicts, the WRC has been conspicuously absent in mining areas. 
Only in 2007, did it begin to establish an office in the Ankobra Basin, one of 
the most affected areas; despite this the WRC still seems to keep a low profile 
and to avoid getting involved in the politics of mining. This became obvious 
when during the constitution of the Ankobra River Commission the seat for 
NGOs was not given to the well-known NGO WACAM, which has quite 
successfully confronted mining companies on behalf of the affected commu-
nities. Instead, the seat was given to a small NGO that focuses on reforesta-
tion (personal communication with NGO representatives in November 2007). 
These examples show, how the new legal requirements that have been 
created through the water reforms are brushed away in areas of political and 
economic importance and how the WRC, in order to avoid getting in the way 
of politicians and powerful interest groups, fails to live up to its mandate and 
responsibilities. 
How the WRC, despite the hard effort and serious intentions of its staff, 
is going to organise the local implementation of the Ghanaian water reforms 
is also problematic. It lacks the mandate, as well as the financial and human 
capacities, to engage in the local implementation of the water use regula-
tions. Therefore, the monitoring and allocation of water use rights are sup-
posed to be undertaken by local governments with the help of traditional au-
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thorities (Opoku-Agyemang 2005: 27-4). However, the DAs are not well-
equipped for this task (either). They are already overburdened with respon-
sibilities and suffer from a lack of funding as well as qualified staff (Asibuo 
2000 / UNEP 2001). Furthermore, local governance is often ridden by corrup-
tion and political patronage, as downward accountability and public partici-
pation are lacking (Crawford 2004: 25). In order to show how the implemen-
tation of official regulations works out in a concrete local political arena, and 
how diverging interests and agendas are locally negotiated, we shall take a 
look at the example of the Tono irrigation project.  
Natural resources management within the Tono irrigation project 
Research objectives and methods 
The following summarises results from my own anthropological research 
undertaken in the Tono irrigation project in the Kassena Nankana District of 
the Upper East Region in Ghana4. The research objective has been to under-
stand how local resource management takes place, which institutions and ac-
tors are involved, and how the institutional framework influences the sus-
tainability as well as the social and economic outcomes of the existing local 
resource regimes. As the project is rather large and involves nine communi-
ties and about 4,000 small-scale and commercial farmers, research focussed 
on a particular community and its farming zones. Qualitative research meth-
ods based on participant observation were used because many local actors 
reject rules and obscure their practices when confronted with more formal 
research approaches. They feel uneasy when faced with questionnaires and 
recorders. I spent about fourteen months in the district capital Navrongo, in 
the research community, and in the Tono irrigation scheme. In order to de-
velop a better rapport with local actors, to gain impressions of economic 
strategies, patterns of social differentiation, and the institutions and negotia-
tions that are involved in getting access to water and land, I engaged in farm-
ing myself. Farming offered many opportunities to discuss with different lo-
cal actors, such as farm labourers, small-scale farmers, commercial farmers, 
extension officers, water engineers and members of the project management 
and chiefs. Information was obtained through informal communication and 
semi-structured interviews as well as through observations during a number 
of meetings dealing with issues of land and water management and alloca-
tion. I also conducted formal and semi-structured interviews in order to de-
velop a picture of the institutional development in the irrigation scheme and 
to obtain quantitative data on small-scale farmer’s economic strategies. 
                                            
4  The research, conducted in several stays between 2001 and 2005, was part of the 
GLOWA-Volta research project of the Center for Development Research (ZEF) of the Uni-
versity of Bonn, funded by the German Federal Ministry for Education and Research. 
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Irrigation in the Kassena Nankana District of the Upper East Region 
In the rural settlements of the Kassena Nankana District, almost all house-
holds depend largely on agriculture for their livelihood. Families engage in 
the rain-fed cultivation of millet, guinea corn, ground nuts, beans and a vari-
ety of local vegetables. Cultivation takes place on farms surrounding the 
compounds, on family land located at some distance from the homesteads, 
and on bush farms even farther away. Land is allocated by tindanas.5 Tin-
danas are held in high regard, since they are able to communicate with earth 
and water deities through the medium of their ancestors. They perform regular 
rituals to ensure purification of land and water resources, for the well being of 
the crops, and for the fertility of the land, the livestock and the human popula-
tion of their respective territory. Land distributed by the tindanas may become 
non-revertible family property after years of continuous cultivation or can re-
vert to the tindanas, as it is the case with periodically used bush farms. 
As the population density in the Southern part of the Kassena Nankana 
District was very low, up to the 1960s, and land was available in abundance, 
soil fertility could be sustained through a fallow system. As the population 
grew, the fallow system was abandoned. Since farms are continuously used, 
soils are degrading and yields are declining (Blench 1999: 25-26). Local agri-
culture has long been exposed to climatic risk. Rainfall patterns are very un-
reliable with an average of 900-1000 mm of precipitation falling in a single 
rainy season between April and October; which cause droughts and floods 
that frequently affect local production. According to local farmers, the situa-
tion has worsened since the 1980s, as early and late rains, which are very im-
portant for their agricultural activities, become less reliable. But local farmers 
do not only rely on rain-fed agriculture but also practise irrigation6. As tradi-
tional land-use patterns came increasingly under pressure and irrigation 
proved to be profitable7, the area under irrigation increased enormously. 
Since the 1990s, irrigable land, formerly lying idle, has become scarce. The 
                                            
5  Tindanas are locally perceived as the successors of the settlers who first inhabited a cer-
tain portion of land. However, these claims are frequently contested, as settlement histories 
are challenged, and different claims about who is first comer and who is latecomer exist 
(e.g. Lentz 1998, 53-54, for the Upper West Region). 
6  Irrigation techniques have been introduced in the area since colonial times. Government-
driven irrigation proliferation in the district followed two paths: (1) the construction of 
small dams, (2) the construction of the Tono irrigation project. Additionally, small-scale 
farmers have expanded vegetable gardening, using groundwater along the dry riverbeds. 
Commercial vegetable cultivation with motorized pumps has spread along the river beds 
and waste water channels of the irrigation scheme. 
7  But irrigation entails some risks. In 2003, large parts of the tomato crop were affected by 
disease, while in the dry season 2006/07 the crop rotted as tomato traders rather imported 
tomato from neighbouring Burkina Faso. 
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widespread dissemination and adoption of irrigation techniques has not only 
affected local patterns of production and livelihoods, but resulted in new 
ways in which access to land and water was managed, especially in the Tono 
irrigation project.  
 
Land and water management within the Tono irrigation project 
 
The Tono irrigation scheme was constructed between 1976 and 1986. When 
the construction of the Tono irrigation scheme was planned, the local para-
mount chief was approached by government representatives to coordinate 
the acquisition and the compensation procedures for the necessary land 
(Konings 1986: 270 ff.). Land in Northern Ghana, was state property and 
could be acquired by the government without compensation from colonial 
times up to the 1979 constitution – when land reverted back to unspecified 
former landowners. The latter created a large degree of tenure insecurity and 
litigation (Lund 2006: 77 ff.). Compensation had only to be paid for houses, 
crops and fruit trees. The forceful expropriation of land proved to be a trau-
matic experience to those, who lost their farms and homesteads. However, 
according to local elders, the expropriation did not create a great deal of local 
opposition, as people were wary of the ruling military regime and felt that 
the (Tono) construction might bring some beneficial development, as the 
construction was supervised by white engineers (Laube 2007: 91-92). Al-
though entitled to compensation for buildings and fruit trees, small-scale 
farmers were hardly compensated and the local paramount chief allegedly 
never redistributed the funds given to him for the compensation of farmers 
and land holders. 
After the construction of the irrigation scheme had been completed, ex-
propriated lands were only partially redistributed amongst the local small-
scale farmers. Most were given to state farms, military officers and members 
of local, regional and even national political, administrative and economic el-
ites. Soon afterwards, when farming by absent commercial farmers proved 
unprofitable and parts of the irrigable land lay fallow, the project manage-
ment decided to involve small-scale farmers. Farmers, who were initially 
dispossessed, were to be favoured in land allocation. But as many of them 
were lacking capital for irrigation farming and others were reluctant to coop-
erate with the project management, only few plots were allocated to the 
original owners. Instead, young and adventurous farmers, who had gathered 
experience as farm boys on commercial farms, took over vacant plots.  
The project management proved to be incapable of effectively control-
ling hundreds of small-scale farmers and organising the collection of irriga-
tion fees as well as the repayment of input loans. Therefore, Village Commit-
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tees (VCs)8 were established in 1987. Since then, parts of the project land 
have been allocated to the VCs that represent the nine villages surrounding 
the scheme. The remaining land has been directly allocated by the project 
management of the parastatal irrigation company ICOUR, which has re-
placed the expatriate project management that had initially run the project. 
The village committees consist of all irrigation farmers of one village 
and are headed by an executive. The executives have to oversee land and wa-
ter allocation within the project zones allocated to the VCs, collect payments, 
and inform the local communities about current irrigation policies and 
schedules. 
Although large parts of the project area are now managed by the VCs, 
the irrigation company still sees itself as the owner of all the project land.9 
However, many of the original landowners, who were never adequately 
compensated, maintain that the lands are theirs, and that they should be ei-
ther compensated or the lands should revert back to them. Land claims of 
original landowners are a constant source of conflicts as irrigable land has 
become scarce and some of the original landholders only have access to 
smaller and inferior plots. 
The allocation of the land within the project is revised every five years 
by a committee, which is chaired by the head of the district administration. It 
consists of representatives of the project management, the Ministry of Food 
and Agriculture, and commercial and small-scale farmers. According to an 
assessment of maintenance activities, cultivation efficiency, and payment re-
cords, land is given to various VC’s. Within the villages, the VC executive al-
locates plots to farmers, who in turn have to pay water levies according to 
the size of their plot and the crop they are cultivating. Land allocated to indi-
vidual farmers can not be withdrawn, unless the farmer fails to pay his water 
levies or other inputs arising from the project. The project management allo-
cates all land not controlled or allocated by the VCs.  
Although the responsibilities and procedures for land allocation seem to 
be clearly defined, the interference of traditional and neo-traditional authori-
ties, as well as a high degree of informal arrangements and rule deviance 
makes for a much more complex picture. The executive of the VCs, which 
should be democratically elected, is usually comprised of representatives of 
the various clans of a village and is headed by a representative of the tin-
dana’s lineage. The selection is based on negotiation processes between local 
chiefs and opinion leaders. While this is an interesting adaptation of local 
                                            
8  The idea of involving Village Committees in the management of the irrigation project 
was also the result of the retrenchment programmes that followed the SAPs, during which 
the project management lost more than half of its staff. 
9  The project management claims that since 2002, 80% of the land was under control of 
VC’s. 
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tradition to the formal project structure, in fact, it often turns out to be flawed 
with regard to the effectiveness and the accountability of local resource man-
agement. Social origins rather than merits, and selection rather than election, 
qualify VC executive members in the perspective of local decision makers. 
The result is that members of the VC executive not only lack the competence 
and administrative skills they need, but also represent the particular interest 
of local factions. As land issues frequently become an arena for local disputes 
– original landholders compete with those who acquired land at an earlier 
phase, and local clans blame each other for trying to monopolize scarce re-
sources – the efficiency of VCs is often compromised. Decision making be-
comes non-transparent and causes further conflicts. The legitimacy of and re-
spect for the VC executives’ decisions are also undermined by local chiefs –
who are local authorities acknowledged by the government but with little 
traditional legitimacy in the local community10. They tend to bypass the VCs 
in favour of themselves and their clientele. This happens with the project 
managements’ approval, because the irrigation company frequently depends 
on the chiefs to control or bill farmers. But even the VC executives them-
selves don’t always abide by the formal rules in place. Members of the VC 
executive are known to allocate lands to outsiders paying bribes, and this 
practice diminishes the VC executives’ legitimacy and the respect for its deci-
sions.  
As all irrigable plots have been allocated but not all lands within the 
project area have been developed, the areas that have been left undeveloped – 
because of low fertility, topography, drainage and environmental protection – 
are increasingly put under pressure. In the developed areas, the farmers’ de-
pendence on irrigation water provided by the company makes it difficult for 
them to directly contest the land ownership of the irrigation company. But in 
the undeveloped areas, tindanas and original landholders have, to the re-
sentment of the project management, started to allocate land. The project 
management tries to protect ecological buffer zones but usually finds it diffi-
cult to stop farmers from encroachment. Plots along the wastewater chan-
nels, left undeveloped for environmental reasons, are highly fertile, provide 
easy access to wastewater, and are under high demand. Mostly commercial 
farmers, with the necessary capital to run pumps, encroach upon theses ar-
eas. They are usually well connected with local politicians and have close 
(business) relations to the project administration. Thus, their activities are 
rarely stopped. Encroaching small-scale farmers, who often illegally extend 
                                            
10  Chieftaincy is an institution that had not been strongly developed in the formerly rather 
acephalous societies in this part of Northern Ghana, although locally chiefs and big men 
may well have dominated local arenas in certain areas (Der 2001: 57). During the reign of 
the British, the institution was strengthened and further propagated after independence 
(Laube 2007: 54-55).  
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irrigation channels to draw water into the protection zones, are frequently 
supported by chiefs, who give their backing to satisfy their clientele. 
In the zones under ICOUR management, land allocation procedures 
also do not follow clear cut rules. Large amounts of land are allocated to poli-
ticians, members of the administration, project personnel and a number of 
commercial farmers who have established business relationships with the 
project management. Within the areas managed by the irrigation bureauc-
racy, only few small-scale farmers with good relationships to project man-
agement get access to plots. The fact that allocation practices are based on pa-
tronage, nepotism as well as corruption is visible to all farmers and severely 
undermines the legitimacy and enforcement power of the project manage-
ment (Laube 2007: 316-317). 
Looking at the land allocation procedures within the Tono irrigation 
project a complex setting unfolds. Formal and informal rules and various ac-
tors are involved in the allocation of land and the disputes that go along with 
it. Various actors invoke various formal as well as informal institutions, but 
may breach the same set of rules, while they compete for power and compe-
tencies. It is not only the project management and the VCs that allocate pro-
ject land, but also politicians, commercial farmers and chiefs. Tindanas as well 
as original landholders do so in formerly undeveloped areas. Legal pluralism 
visible in ‘forum shopping’ and ‘shopping forums’ is paralleled by a deeply 
engrained contempt for rules and regulations. However, ‘triangles of accu-
mulation’ (Migdal, 1989: 238 ff) between commercial farmers, project manag-
ers, local administrators and politicians allow local elites to gain preferential 
access to water and land. 
Water allocation is less complex than land allocation, but it is character-
ized by a similar lack of institutional legitimacy and enforceability. Neverthe-
less, ownership of water is uncontested. Because the dam of the project has 
been constructed by the government, most informants agree that the water 
belongs to the irrigation company. 
The irrigation company collects water levies according to the plot sizes 
and the crops cultivated. Water engineers are responsible for the irrigation 
schedules of the project and water bailiffs serve all zones and laterals with 
water at fixed intervals according to these schedules. The water bailiffs over-
see chief irrigators (trained small-scale farmers) who are responsible for the 
allocation of water within lateral canals. The fields at the tail end of the lat-
eral are supposed to be irrigated first, while the other farms will be succes-
sively irrigated until the plots at the mouth have received water. 
However, chief irrigators lack the power to effectively supervise water 
allocation within the lateral canals. Small-scale and commercial farmers irri-
gate their farms as they see fit and disputes over water allocation frequently 
arise. If farmers need water when it is not the turn of their farming area, they 
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frequently break the lock at the valve of their lateral canal and channel water 
to their plots. This practice should be fined, but sanctions are rarely imposed. 
Commercial farmers and project personnel can easily influence the wa-
ter bailiffs to channel additional water to their plots. They farm together and 
are colleagues. Water bailiffs also accept bribes for extra services. Self-
interest, disrespect for institutions, and the lack of sanctions is extending so 
far that project personnel has been observed destroying project infrastructure 
in order to direct water to their own farms or plots of farming friends. Water 
allocation within the project has not been affected by national water reform 
processes; most farmers and parts of the project management are not aware 
of the WRC and its regulations. 
This short description of natural resource management within the Tono 
irrigation project shows how the control of natural resources remains con-
tested even in a clearly defined area where the Ghanaian government has 
formally established control over land and water. In disputes and negotia-
tions over resources, various actors invoke different sets of official and/or lo-
cal rules to pursue their individual benefits. The acknowledgement of the 
overall legitimacy and enforceability of rules and regulations is low, and rule 
deviances as well as administrative malpractices make for an institutional 
setting, in which the self-interest of actors accounts for many resource man-
agement decisions. The lack of accepted legitimacy of institutions and poor 
enforceability of rules , as well as the fact that actors well-endowed with so-
cial, economic and political capital are able to manipulate and circumvent in-
stitutions most effectively, compromise the equity, economic efficiency and 
environmental sustainability of the overall project. 
Conclusions 
This article has argued that water reforms in Ghana have followed neo-
liberal development trajectories that are largely promoted by international 
donor organisations. In the course of these reforms, the need to develop a 
supervisory body for the water sector evolved because potential investors 
required security for their investments in the water sector. What followed 
was the enactment of a new water law that reflected the IWRM paradigm, 
created the WRC and vested all water rights in the state. However, despite 
relentless efforts by the WRC, the impact of the new legislation on the 
ground is minute, and old water rights continue to exist de facto. Lacking the 
political will to implement the new water law, the government has allocated 
only few resources to the WRC, which is therefore unable to implement the 
new legislation comprehensively. The weakness of the WRC has two conse-
quences. First, the WRC lacks the ability and funds to organise the imple-
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mentation of the new legislation at the local level. Secondly, it lacks the 
power to interfere with decisions of high political and economic importance. 
At the local level, the WRC depends on DAs and chiefs to implement its 
regulations, and the straightforward implementation of regulations seems to 
be difficult. As the example of the Tono irrigation scheme has shown, multi-
ple institutions and actors are involved in the management of natural re-
sources. Various actors have overlapping and conflicting responsibilities and 
interests. They are engaged in continuing negotiations and contestations over 
the access to irrigated land and water resources. Within this process/these 
processes, different institutional frameworks, such as national laws and poli-
cies, project rules and regulations as well as local norms and values are used 
as reference points for argumentation but not necessarily as guidelines for 
action. Institutional complexity is further increased by a fundamental lack of 
irrefutable institutional legitimacy, enforcement power and rule compliance. 
Corruption, nepotism and political patronage are facets of weak local gov-
ernment structures that often influence resource management more than 
formal rules. While legal pluralism may be an impediment to the implemen-
tation of water reforms, local power structures entail the danger of elite cap-
ture of resources and the exclusion of less powerful and underprivileged 
parts of the local society. Given the vested interest that actors – not only in 
Northern Ghana – hold in natural resources, it seems unlikely that the DAs 
will be able to implement water reforms in a transparent, accountable and 
equitable manner under the present regime. 
This problem is acerbated by the fact that the water use registration 
procedures envisioned pose a disincentive for small-scale water users to co-
operate. They might rather arouse suspicion, as water users could fear regis-
tration to be a threat to their livelihoods and business activities. The cost of 
registration as well as the lack of the ability to influence decision making in 
the water sector can easily lead to the withdrawal and/or the resistance of 
local water users. The failure to get them involved in the reform process, 
might also open up the risk of their exclusion from the access to vital water 
resources and create new inequalities and conflicts as, for instance, experi-
enced during land titling exercises in Ghana (Kasanga 2001). 
At the national level similar problems exist. The WRC lacks the power 
to enforce the new water laws against the vested economic and political in-
terest of powerful groups. Examples of the Bui dam and from the mining sec-
tor cited above have shown that the WRC can be largely ignored, when it 
comes to important issues in the water sector. This raises the suspicion that 
the WRC’s deprivation of sufficient resources is politically intended, as it al-
lows the government to continue to independently make important water re-
source management decisions. This is problematic because in the face of in-
creasing water demand and dwindling resources important decisions about 
the allocation of water resources lie ahead. Such decisions could have not 
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only significant economic consequences but touch upon crucial regional in-
terests (e.g. Northern agricultural livelihoods vs. Southern domestic and in-
dustrial power demand) and social issues (e.g. rural poor vs. urban middle-
class). If such decisions are taken without the consent of water users, but 
based only on political considerations and the economic interest of powerful 
interest groups, they could have considerable social impact and large conflic-
tive potential. Therefore, a strong and independent regulatory body, able to 
effectively negotiate various interests in order to prevent socially unaccept-
able resource allocation and conflicts, is needed. 
Ghanaian water reforms have promised to establish a framework for the 
ecologically sustainable, socially equitable, and economically efficient man-
agement of the country’s water resources. However, it seems that the reforms 
have mainly served to promote general neo-liberal policies, without bringing 
about the specific objectives envisaged. As the implementation of the reforms 
is hindered at the national level and left to local authorities at the district 
level, the promises are not kept. This creates serious social as well as ecologi-
cal perils. Poor, powerless and less well-connected actors may be denied ac-
cess to vital resources while the resources might be overused and polluted. 
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Zusammenfassung 
 
Im Jahr 1996 hat die ghanaische Regierung im Zuge von Privatisierungsvorhaben 
im Trinkwasserbereich eine weitgehende Wassersektorreform eingeleitet. Die Was-
serressourcen des Landes unterstehen nun offiziell der Kontrolle der Water Resour-
ces Commission (WRC), die ein integriertes Wasserressourcenmanagement (IWRM) 
propagiert und für eine effiziente, nachhaltige und gerechte Wassernutzung sor-
gen soll. Am Beispiel eines Bewässerungsgebietes in Nordghana wird gezeigt, 
welche Schwierigkeiten bei der lokalen Umsetzung der Wasserreform zu erwar-
ten sind. Angesichts der lokalen politischen Verhältnisse, die durch Rechtsplura-
lismus und schwache Regierungsstrukturen gekennzeichnet sind, stellt sich die 
Frage, wie die mit nur geringen Ressourcen ausgestattete WRC ihre Reformpläne 
lokal umsetzen kann. Da die neue Behörde auch auf nationaler Ebene nicht in der 
Lage ist, wichtige Entscheidungen im Wassersektor zu beeinflussen, besteht die 
Gefahr, dass die Reform von sowohl lokalen als auch nationalen einflussreichen 
Interessengruppen dazu genutzt wird, die Durchsetzung von Partikularinteres-
sen zu legitimieren und zugleich andere von der Nutzung der Wasserressourcen 
auszuschließen sowie ökologische Belange zu vernachlässigen. 
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Résumé 
Le gouvernement ghanéen a lancé en 1996 une large réforme du secteur de l’eau 
à la suite de projets de privatisation dans le domaine de l’eau potable. Les res-
sources en eau du pays sont donc maintenant soumises officiellement au contrôle 
de la Water Resources Commission (WRC) qui préconise une gestion intégrée des 
ressources en eau (IWRM) et doit garantir une utilisation de l’eau efficace, dura-
ble et plus juste. A partir de l’exemple d’une zone d’irrigation dans le nord du 
Ghana, les difficultés liées à l’application locale de la réfome de l’eau sont mises 
en évidence. La situation politique locale étant caractérisée par un pluralisme ju-
ridique et de faibles structures gouvernementales, une question s’impose: com-
ment la WRC va-t-elle pouvoir implanter ses réformes au niveau local, alors 
qu’elle ne dispose que de peu de moyens ? Cette nouvelle institution n’est égale-
ment pas en mesure d’influencer les décisions importantes prises dans le do-
maine de l’eau au niveau national. Il est donc fort à craindre que la réforme, aussi 
bien au niveau local que national, va être le jeu d’influents groupes de pression 
qui vont s’en servir pour légitimer leurs intérêts particuliers, tandis que d’autres 
n’auront pas accès aux ressources en eau et que les questions écologiques ne se-
ront pas prises en compte. 
Mots clés 
réforme de l’eau, Etat et administration locale, propriété foncière et occupation des sols, 
irrigation, Ghana 
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